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[Abstract] 
This study investigates the effect of reciprocal kindness on individual decisions with 
experimental evidences. The literature suggested that the coalition formation could be 
enlarged by altruism. This study employs the reciprocity model to illustrate the reciprocal 
behavior in both dictator and public goods games. We found that an altruistic participant in 
the dictator game could be hostile to others in the public good game due to the negative 
reciprocal feeling. When subjects were essential to make contributions to public goods, they 
were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were 
unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Overall, this 
study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could reshape the provision of public goods.  
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1 Introduction  
The provision of public goods has been discussed for decades. In practice, a series 
of discussions (such as Carraro and Siniscalco (1998); Hoel and Schneider (1997); 
Barrett (2001); Bratberg et al. (2005); Rubio and Ulph (2006); Finus and Rübbelke 
(2013) and Wu and Thill (2018)) has studied the formation of climate coalitions. As 
the milestone study, Barrett (1994), hypothesized that countries are self-interested 
and self-enforced to participate in a coalition. Most literature (such as Bahn et al. 
(2009); Breton et al. (2010); Finus et al. (2006)) suggested that stable coalitions achieve 
only little if no additional mechanism is provided in the agreement.  
Smaller equilibrium coalitions have been challenged by some practical IEAs and 
experimental studies (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 2001; Kosfeld et al. 2009; Burger 
and Kolstad 2010). They suggested that high levels of cooperation do exist in the 
absence of policy interventions. These studies have claimed that people are far less 
likely to offer a free ride and more likely to cooperate than the Nash prediction 
suggests. Social (or other-regarding) preferences have been proposed by recent 
studies (such as Charness and Rabin (2002); Hadjiyiannis et al. (2012) and 
Dannenberg et al. (2015)) to address this knowledge gap.  
Whilst social preferences have received some attention from economists, 
unidirectional social preferences have been discussed. For example, simple altruism 
proposed that people may care not only about their own well-being but also about 
the well-being of others. Such concern for others is unidirectional and does not ask 
for anything in return. Yet, psychological evidence indicates that most altruistic 
behavior is more complex (Rabin 1993). People make decisions based on how they 
are treated by others: when they meet altruistic people, they are generous; when 
they meet hostile people, they are mean.  
The motivation underlying reciprocal behavior has been discussed. Such studies 
can be categorized into three groups depending on motivations: reciprocal fairness 
(e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), reciprocal altruism 
(Levine 1998) (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004), and the quest for efficiency gains 
through (Brandts and Schram 2001). There are also overviews of these (Seinen and 
Schram 2006). The reciprocal model has been proposed to illustrate the experimental 
results, such as ultimatum bargaining game (Dickinson 2000) and public goods 
games (Bardsley and Moffatt 2007). In this paper, we intend to contribute to 
discussions of the motivations underlying reciprocal altruism and build a bridge to 
connect experimental evidences.  
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In a previous study, Lin (2017) considered the impact of an unidirectional 
individual altruistic preference for the formation of a climate coalition. The study 
provided a particular design of dominant strategy equilibrium to predict individual 
behaviors and coalition formation. However, the experimental result showed that a 
player could be kind in a unidirectional dictator game but be hostile in an interactive 
public-good game. It means unidirectional altruistic model was unable to predict 
decisions in an interactive game. In order to understand the cooperative behavior of 
individuals, this study employs the model of reciprocity.  
This study asks the following research questions: (1) is individual social 
preference unidirectional or mutual? (2) Is coalition formation affected by individual 
social preferences? The first question asks about the magnitudes of unidirectional 
and mutual impacts at an individual level. The second question asks about 
individual impacts at a global level. The literature has shown that a grand coalition 
or a majority coalition may be stabilized by sufficiently strong and widespread 
reciprocity preferences. However, it is questionable whether this remains realistic in 
practice.  
This study examines individual reciprocal preferences by employing Rabin 
(1993)’s framework of reciprocity and Lin (2017)’s experimental evidence. The 
reciprocal model considers a player’s own payoff, the player’s perception of others’ 
payoffs, and others’ perception of the player’s payoff. The experimental design 
considers the public goods game but limited in a scope of dominant strategy 
equilibrium. It provides the primary strength of investigating individual incentives 
for participating in a coalition. If there were more than one stable coalition, the 
individual decisions were difficult to be predicted. A dominant strategy equilibrium, 
therefore, provides a suitable environment in which to observe individual decisions 
when every player had an optimal strategy to choose.  
With the reciprocal preference, the coalition formation could be reshaped and 
different from the dominant strategy equilibrium. Due to the interactive perceptions 
of players’ payoffs, the coalition size might become smaller or larger than the self-
interested dominant strategy equilibrium. This study contributes to the 
understanding of climate coalition formation. Particularly, we examine how 
individual reciprocity preferences affect a coalition. We find that individuals have 
reciprocal altruism toward others. In other words, their decisions depend on how 
they are treated by others.  
This study consists of five sections: section 2 describes the model of reciprocity. 
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Section 3 illustrates the experimental design. Section 4 analyses the reciprocal 
behavior with experimental evidence. The final section concludes.    
2 Model of Reciprocity  
Consider a reciprocity model with N players, following Rabin (1993), a strategy 
set    for player i where        . The material payoff of a player    depends on 
the strategies chosen by players i and others (      ). We use the following 
notation:       represents the actual strategies chosen by the player;       
represents other non-i player’s belief about which strategy player i is choosing; 
      represents player i’s belief about what other players believe player i’s 
strategy is.  
We assume that player  ’s subjective expected welfare depends on three kindness 
preferences: (i) player  ’s own interest, (ii) other players’ interests and (iii) the player 
 ’s interest influenced by other players’ strategies. A player   chooses a strategy to 
maximize her expected welfare, which incorporates both her material utility and the 
players’ shared notion of fairness:  
(1)       
        
              
           
The first term   
  is pure self-interest, the second term contains reciprocal kindness, 
  
 , and straight kindness,   
 . Both straight kindness and reciprocal kindness are in 
the range of    and    .  
Reciprocal kindness indicates how player   experiences other players’ kindness, 
while straight kindness indicates player  ’s kindness to other players. The impact of 
reciprocal kindness in welfare depends on a player’s feeling for others. If the player 
feels being treated badly, her overall welfare will be lower than her monetary payoff. 
On the other hand, straight kindness plays the role of strength of feeling. If a player 
is straightly hostile, she cares less about others’ decisions. But if a player is straight 
generous, her welfare depends on the communication of kindness: if she is treated 
kindly, her welfare is higher; if she is treated badly, her welfare is lower than the 
monetary payoff. These types of kindness are defined as follows.   
Definition 1: Reciprocal kindness defines player     belief about how kind other 
players are being to her  
(2)    
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if   
        
         , then   
           . 
Player  ’s reciprocal kindness consists of her payoffs:            is the payoff that i 
chooses what others believe and others choose what i believes.   
       and   
       
are the highest and lowest payoffs in the set of all feasible Pareto-efficient payoffs 
respectively.   
       is the equitable payoff defined as the average of the highest and 
lowest payoffs,    
         
         ; and   
        is the worst possible payoff 
for player   in the set of all possible payoffs.  
Definition 2: Straight kindness defines player  ’s kindness to other non-i players  
(3)    
          
              
        
   
           
        
   
if    
           
          , then   
           . 
On the other hand, Player  ’s straight kindness consists of the payoffs of other 
players:             is a non-i player’s payoff that what i chooses and what i 
believes others’ would do.    
          and    
        are the highest and lowest 
payoffs which a non-i player could get in the set of all feasible Pareto-efficient 
payoffs respectively. The equitable payoff,    
        ,  is the average of the highest 
and lowest payoffs; and and   
        is the worst possible payoff for a non-   
player in the set of all possible payoffs.  
In practice, we assume that beliefs    and    are player i’s actual behavior in 
the past. In other words, what a player would believe and would like the others to 
believe are based on the past decisions. Thus            is player i’s payoff in the 
past round, while             is a non-i player’s payoff given i’s present decision 
and others’ past decisions.  
3 Experimental Design 
This study employs the reciprocal model to illustrate individual behaviour in a 
laboratory experiment of Lin (2017). There were fifty students with multi-cultural 
and multi-disciplinary backgrounds were invited. The experiment consisted of two 
parts: the first part is a dictator game which examined individual altruistic attitudes, 
and the second part is a public goods game which measured interactive social 
preferences.  
In the dictator game, subjects were anonymously and randomly paired with each 
other to make 20 ‘keep’ or ‘give’ decisions. In each round, each subject was given 1 
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token, and they decided whether to give it to their partners. On the other hand, they 
did not know their partner’s decision until the end of the session. In the 20 rounds, 
there were different monetary values for keeping and giving the token.  
Table 2 reports the number of tokens subjects decided to give when the values of 
keeping and giving the tokens varied. As mentioned earlier, different monetary 
values were attributed to keeping and giving the tokens (   and    respectively). 
The ratio of keeping-to-giving values (     ) was designed from 1 to 0.05 in 20 
rounds.  
In the dictator game, subjects did not know how they were treated by their 
partners. Therefore, only pure altruism – but no reciprocal altruism – was calculated. 
Because the decisions of both keeping and giving are Pareto-efficient solutions, the 
lowest and worst payoffs for other players were the same (i.e., not giving to the 
partner). A subject’s straight kindness level is either      (keep) or     (give).  
Turning now to the experiment on public good provision, subjects were randomly 
assigned to groups of 5 persons for the whole session, which was conducted 
anonymously. Payoffs for each player were not identical. The players’ payoffs, in the 
range of £0 to £24, depended on their decisions and the combination of players in the 
coalition. They were asked to make a decision to join or not join a coalition for 4 
different treatments in 60 rounds. Individuals decided whether to contribute to the 
group by joining or not to contribute by not-joining. In contrast to the altruism test, 
at the end of each round, subjects were informed about their own payoffs, other 
group members’ decisions, and the public good provision.  
Tables 1A and 1B show each player’s marginal benefits in eight treatments. Five 
subjects played four treatments in 60 rounds. Their payoffs depended on the 
individual marginal benefit of the total contribution: a signatory’s payoff is the 
marginal benefit times the summation of all signatories’ marginal benefits, minus the 
participation cost; a non-signatory’s payoff is the marginal benefit times the 
summation of all signatories’ marginal benefits. The treatments were designed for 
stable coalitions of 2 to 4 critical players. As explained earlier, based on the 
assumption of self-interest, the dominant strategy equilibrium design could help to 
identify individual decisions. Critical players were essential for an effective coalition, 
while noncritical players had the incentive to free ride. 
In particular, the experiment developed treatments with a self-interested 
dominant strategy equilibrium condition. Each player had a clear dominant strategy 
for whether to participate in a coalition. Players were divided into two groups: 
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critical players, who were essential to an effective coalition, and noncritical players, 
who were able to free-ride the public good benefits. The condition implies that any 
critical country could not be replaced by the joint of noncritical players. In other 
words, critical players would participate in a coalition because they were necessary 
members, and noncritical players would not participate because of the free-riding 
advantage. The condition ensures that the formation was the only stable effective 
coalition.  
In an effective coalition, a signatory’s payoff is the summation of all signatories’ 
marginal benefit subtract the standard abatement cost whilst a nonsignatory’s payoff 
is the product of her individual benefit and the coalition size. When an effective 
coalition collapses, all players get nothing. It is worth noting that, this mode focuses 
on a dominant strategy equilibrium which players are categorized into two types: 
critical and non-critical to an effective coalition. Critical players have a dominant 
strategy to cooperate whilst non-critical players have a dominant strategy to free-
ride. Hence, a critical player could reach the highest payoff when all players 
cooperate, while a non-critical player reach her highest payoff when she is the only 
free-rider. The lowest Pareto-efficient payoff is the payoff in the dominant strategy 
equilibrium which critical players participate for the shared coalition payoff and 
non-critical players do not participate for the free-riding benefit. As defined, the 
equitable payoff    
       is the average of the highest and lowest payoffs. Besides, 
the worst possible payoff for others    
         would be 0.  
Notice that the signs of reciprocal and straight kindness depend on the 
numerators since the denominators are positive number. When the player earns less 
than the equitable payoff, the player would think other players are hostile to her. 
When other player earns less than the equitable payoff, the player is hostile to others.  
Consider an example when all players participate in a coalition, the collective 
payoff reaches the highest level. A critical player has positive straight and reciprocal 
kindness. It means the player’s welfare is more than her monetary payoff in a grand 
coalition. In contrast, due to the unreached free-riding benefit, a non-critical player 
feels other players are being hostile to her. The player’s welfare would be lower than 
her monetary payoff. Thus, non-critical players would be unwilling to coordinate 
with others.  
Take the example of the dominant strategy equilibrium, a non-critical player is 
hostile toward other players because she is unable to reach the highest free-riding 
benefit. Her welfare would be less than her material payoff. On the other hand, a 
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critical player behaves kindly to others but feels non-critical players are mean to her. 
Such hostility may lead other players to undertake costly punishment by the critical 
player. The consequence of dominant strategy equilibrium would become unstable 
internally.  
When a critical player decides to take revenge with non-cooperative behavior, the 
coalition becomes ineffective and everyone earns nothing. It means all possible 
responses yield other players the same payoff. Therefore, there is no issue of 
kindness. This situation would be changed when the critical player believes that 
other players would behave cooperatively. The player would participate when she 
believes the coalition could be larger than the dominant strategy equilibrium.  
Together these results provide important insights into the unstable coalition 
formation, due to players’ beliefs and reciprocal behaviour. In a grand coalition, non-
critical players might feel hostile for the unreached free-riding benefit. In the 
dominant strategy equilibrium, critical players might feel hostile toward the free-
riders. Thus the coalition formation could be reshaped by their beliefs and 
preferences.  
4 Analyses with experimental evidence 
Turning now to the experimental evidence on the dictator game and the public 
goods game, the observation of subjects’ decisions illustrates the straight and 
reciprocal kindness.    
In the dictator game, it is perhaps unsurprising that no subject decided to give 
his/her tokens in the first round. However, when the ratio of keeping-to-giving 
values became smaller, more and more subjects would give their tokens away. In the 
final round, nearly 60% of subjects gave up the token for £0.5 to allow a stranger to 
earn £10.  
As mentioned earlier, the constrained design limited the observation on the 
subjects’ straight kindness attitudes in the dictator game. The subject’s average 
straight kindness level in 20 rounds is (     ), which implies that subjects were 
hostile to others in general. In general, an increasing trend is noticed, such that 
subjects became altruistic when the token was more valuable to receivers than to 
givers. This interesting point shows that the value to the giver is an important factor 
in a subject’s decision-making. When the value of the token to a giver was small, 
subjects were more likely to behave kindly by giving it up.  
Table 3 shows the OLS estimation of straight kindness attitude. The dependent 
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variable is the individual’s average straight kindness level. Independent variables are 
the factors selected from the questionnaire, including subjects’ ages, political 
attitudes, and religious attitudes. The results show that only religious attitude is 
significant for the subject’s altruism, at a 10% level. In other words, subjects with 
stronger religious beliefs behaved more altruistically toward others. 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects played a public goods game by 
deciding whether or not to participate in a coalition. The result shows that effective 
coalitions were formed in 387 out of 600 rounds, and the formation was usually 
larger than the self-interested equilibrium size. The actual coalition formation 
matched the dominant strategy equilibrium in only 112 rounds. The coalition was 
usually neither stable nor convergent to a particular formation. With the same 
treatments, the coalition formation varied in different groups. This implies that, even 
with the design of dominant strategy equilibrium, a stable formation was 
unreachable.  
Compared to the individual decisions in the first round, the participation rates in 
the remaining rounds declined from 93% to 85% and from 59% to 46% for the critical 
and noncritical players, respectively. The result shows that individual decisions did 
not converge to the prediction of self-interest, implying that subjects become less 
cooperative after learning other players’ decisions.  
In order to understand the factors that might affect individual decisions, 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of binary probit regressions was employed 
in Table 4. The variables include (v1) the year the subjects were born, (v2) political 
attitudes from left to right, (v3) religious attitudes from atheist to religionist, (v4) the 
dummy variable of being critical players, (v5) the marginal benefit of total 
contribution, (v6) the group contribution in the previous round, (v7) straight 
kindness attitude in the dictator game and (v8) the player’s shared notion of fairness 
in the coalition game.  
The last two factors are related to the reciprocal preference. Firstly, we use the 
subject’s average straight kindness level in 20 rounds in the dictator game. Secondly, 
we used the subjects’ shared notion of fairness which incorporates straight kindness 
and reciprocal kindness in the coalition game. As mentioned earlier, the decisions 
made in the prior round are used to indicate players’ beliefs. Hence, in equations (1) 
and (2),    and    are player 2’s and player 1’s decisions in the past, respectively; 
and    and    are player 1 and player 2’s decisions in the past, respectively.  
The highest and lowest Pareto-efficient payoffs are the highest and lowest payoffs 
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in a possible effective coalition. For a critical player, the highest payoff is a grand 
coalition solution and the lowest Pareto-efficient payoff is the self-interested Nash 
solution. For a noncritical player, the highest payoff is a solution in which the player 
is the only nonsignatory, and the lowest Pareto-efficient payoff occurs when the 
player joins with the critical players only. In addition, the worst payoff occurs when 
no coalition is formed (everyone gets nothing). Because a player faces 4 other players 
in a group, her altruism is the average of her altruism toward other players. Similarly, 
by using the players’ historical decisions, we can determine a player’s reciprocal 
altruism. In other words, a player’s reciprocal altruism is her sense of how kind other 
players were being to her. A subject’s reciprocal kindness attitudes could be indicated 
as the average of her attitudes to other four players in the group.  
The estimations used 2,800 observations (due to the exclusion of the first 
observation in every treatment) in the coalition game. A correlation coefficient was 
computed to assess the relationship between an individual’s straight and reciprocal 
kindness. There was a strong and positive correlation (0.84) between straight and 
reciprocal altruism. The mean values of direct and reciprocal altruism are (      ) 
and (      ), respectively. This means that, in general, subjects were hostile to 
others and were treated badly by others. The average reciprocal altruism was (     ) 
when subjects were critical players, compared to (     ) when they were noncritical 
players. On the other hand, the average reciprocal altruism was (     ) when 
subjects were critical players, compared to (     ) when they were noncritical 
players. Hence, we can say that subjects behaved and were treated badly in general 
and that such feelings were stronger when they were critical players.  
The estimation of Probit MLEs(1) covers all observations of 2800 individual 
decisions. Amongst these observations, the subjects decided to join the coalition a 
total of 1884 times. The result shows that religious attitudes, the dummy variable of 
being a critical player, marginal benefits, past group contributions, straight kindness 
attitude in the dictator game, and the player’s shared notion of fairness in the 
coalition game. When the subjects were critical players, they were more likely to 
participate in the coalition. The intuition behind the result is that they could earn 
monetary reward by doing so. Moreover, larger coalition size in the past would 
increase the motivation to participate.  
Due to negative reciprocal altruism, as mentioned in the previous section, the 
subjects’ overall utilities were usually worse than their monetary payoffs. It is worth 
noting that subjects cared about not only their own payoffs but also payoffs to others. 
However, the more generous they were in the altruism test, the less likely they were 
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to join and make contributions in the public goods game. This interesting result can 
be illustrated with the variable of reciprocal kindness in the public goods game: 
when a subject was treated badly, that subject would be more likely to participate in 
the coalition. In other words, participation was not only self-enforced but also 
complied with a hostile punishment.  
As mentioned earlier, this experimental design set the number of critical players 
required to form an effective coalition. Studying the behavior of critical players can 
enhance our understanding of the decisions of signatories because they were 
essential to stabilizing the coalition internally. Probit MLE(2) examines the 
observations when they were critical players, whilst Probit MLE(3) examine the 
observations when they were non-critical players.  
Probit MLE(2) examines the observations of critical players. If a larger coalition 
was formed in the previous round, those players were more likely to participate. If a 
subject was kind to others in the dictator game, she was less likely to participate and 
form a profitable coalition. The result seems irrational but can be illustrated by 
reciprocal altruism. The worse a subject felt about how she was treated in the prior 
round, the more likely she would be to participate. In other words, how she has been 
treated in the past could alter the decisions. It is worth noting that the participation 
rates in the first round were higher. Negative reciprocal altruism may provide an 
answer: in a coalition larger than the dominant strategy equilibrium, critical players 
were treated kindly when most noncritical players cooperated while non-critical 
players were treated badly. Therefore, their reactions to others became unkind due to 
reciprocal behavior. The more they were kind to others in the altruism test, the 
stronger the reciprocal effect to make them turn down a profitable coalition.  
Having discussed the critical players, the noncritical players were assessed by 
estimating Probit MLE(3). These players had the free-riding incentive; however, the 
result shows that such incentives were rejected for nearly half of the 1200 
observations. Interestingly, individual political and religious attitudes have 
significant but different effects on critical and non-critical players. Pro-left noncritical 
players are likely to free ride. Compared to their results when they were critical 
players, the pro-left-wingers were more likely to participate. In terms of the players’ 
religious preferences, the subjects with less religious belief were more likely to 
cooperate, particularly when they were non-critical players.  
The effect of reciprocal kindness was significant but different to non-critical 
players, compared to critical ones. The higher shared notion of fairness, non-critical 
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players were more likely to cooperate. The result implies that the hostility 
encouraged players giving up the free-riding benefits. However, higher marginal 
benefits brought higher incentives, the free-riding incentive could still led to lower 
participation. In contrast to the experimental evidence of (Burger and Kolstad 2010), 
this study against their earlier finding that higher marginal benefits would 
significantly increase the size of a coalition.  
5 Conclusion  
This study investigates the impact of reciprocal kindness attitudes on individual 
decisions with experimental evidences. The theoretical result suggests that, depends 
on the reciprocal preference, individual welfare could be more or less than the 
monetary payoff. The reciprocity model illustrates the individual decisions in a 
particular experiment which consists of a dictator game and a public goods game. 
The public goods game was designed in a dominant strategy equilibrium. The 
design made players becoming either critical or non-critical to an effective coalition. 
The critical players have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to a 
profitable coalition. On the other hand, the noncritical players have a weakly 
dominant strategy of not joining and are dispensable to the coalition. 
The experiment contains two parts: an altruism test and a public good game. In 
the altruism test, the result confirms the existence of altruistic preferences among 60% 
of the subjects. Altruistic attitudes are significantly correlated to religious attitudes, 
such that a stronger belief leads to a higher altruistic attitude. The incentives for 
participating in a coalition were examined by binary estimations through 3,000 
observations in the membership games. The factors used in the binary regressions 
include the historical records of decisions, dummy variables of player roles, 
individual altruistic attitudes, age, political attitude, religious attitude, the marginal 
benefits of total contributions and the former coalitional formation. 
The dominant strategy equilibrium design is one of the main characteristics used 
in this study to identify individuals’ motivations. This study provides several 
intuitive implications: subjects’ decisions were consistent and pursued higher 
monetary payoffs. Usually, when they were critical to the coalition, subjects followed 
the weakly dominant strategies of participating in a coalition. However, a kind 
subject in the altruism test behaved unkindly toward others in the public good game. 
Regarding the players’ attitudes against reciprocal altruism, when they thought they 
had been treated badly, they were more likely to participate due to the threat of 
punishment. When they became noncritical, such altruistic attitudes were 
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insignificant to their decisions. This surprising result implies that decision makers 
are not self-enforcing in international conventions. However, the decision process is 
too complicated to be captured by a single preference.  
Moreover, the subjects’ preferences significantly affected their decisions. The left-
wingers participated more if they were critical, and they participated less when they 
were noncritical. This interesting result implies that they had less motivation to give 
up the free-riding benefit by joining a coalition. Another important aspect of self-
awareness is that religionists were less likely to join a coalition, and even they were 
kind to others in the anonymous altruism test. Subjects with stronger religious 
beliefs behaved altruistically. However, this does not mean that a stronger religious 
attitude would lead to an altruistic decision in the interactive game. Particularly 
when subjects were noncritical players, a stronger religious attitude leads to a 
weaker motivation to participate.  
Finally, this study provides policy implications by showing that self-interest 
remains the key factor of individual participation in climate coalitions. It is worth 
noting that coalition formation could be affected by reciprocal altruistic preferences. 
Because the decision process becomes more complicated and strategic in the 
interactive environment, coalition formation should be examined with a 
comprehensive investigation that considers other factors, including multiple 
individual preferences. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table.1A. List of parameters of marginal benefit for players in Treatment 1-4 
Rounds Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
1-15 0.675* 0.375* 0.125 0.1 0.075 
16-30 0.075 0.15* 0.25* 0.3* 0.35* 
31-45 0.4* 0.65* 0.075 0.1 0.125 
46-60 0.05 0.1 0.4* 0.35* 0.3* 
 
Table.1B. List of parameters of marginal benefit for players in Treatment 5-8 
Rounds Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
1-15 0.075 0.1 0.45* 0.35* 0.25* 
16-30 0.125 0.1 0.15 0.5* 0.55* 
31-45 0.45* 0.6* 0.05 0.2 0.1 
46-60 0.45* 0.25* 0.2* 0.15* 0.05 
* means critical players  
 
Table 2. The token’s values for keeping (  ), giving (  ), the ratio of keeping to giving 
and the number of subjects decided to give 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
   £1 £10 £7.5 £5 £2.5 £7.5 £5 £0.5 £5 £2.5 
   £1 £10.5 £8 £5.5 £3 £10 £7.5 £1 £10.5 £5.5 
      1 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.5 0.48 0.46 
Number of 
Giving 
0 3 7 7 8 8 8 20 14 9 
 
Round 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
   £1 £2.5 £2.5 £0.5 £1 £1 £0.5 £1 £0.5 £0.5 
   £2.5 £7.5 £10 £2.5 £5.5 £7.5 £5 £10.5 £7.5 £10 
      0.4 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.18 0.13 0.1 0.095 0.07 0.05 
Number of 
Giving 
17 15 17 23 18 18 24 21 25 29 
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Table.3. OLS Estimation for Straight Kindness Attitudes 
Variable Estimation 
Constant term 
      
       
Age 
       
       
Politic attitude 
      
       
Religious attitude 
    * 
       
Total Observation 50 R-squared 0.07 
* means significant at 10% level. 
 
Table.4. Probit Estimations of Probability of Joining a Coalition 
Variable 
Probit 
MLE(1) 
Probit 
MLE(2) 
Probit 
MLE(3) 
Constant term                  
(v1) Age                    
(v2) Politic Attitude      **       **      *** 
(v3) Religious Attitude       **            *** 
(v4) Critical player      ***   
(v5) Marginal Benefit        *** 
(v6) Prior Group Contribution      ***      ***       
(v7) Straight Kindness in Dictator Game       **       **       
(v8) Shared Notion of Fairness       ***       ***      *** 
Total Observations 2800 1540 1260 
Observations of Joining 1884 1308 576 
LR statistic 570.74 101.66 130.83 
Note: Each cell contains coefficient. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
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